We investigate the relative merits of unconditional cash transfers (UCT), conditional cash transfers (CCT), and improvements in education quality on e ciency and welfare. In our setting, some parents under-invest in their children's education because capital market imperfections prevent them from borrowing. Under su ciently accurate targeting, CCT are more e↵ective than UCT in enhancing the e ciency of these households' decisions. However, UCT is superior to CCT in terms of welfare unless targeting is perfect, in which case UCT and CCT are equivalent. Education quality is welfare improving, but may not be e ciency enhancing when public education quality is very low.
1 In this paper, we focus exclusively on the education component of these programs. Most CCT programs also condition on regular check-ups and some also include a nutrition counterpart. For a review of CCT programs, see Das et al. (2005) and Rawlings and Rubio (2005) .
2 Another rationale for CCT is intra-household bargaining, as discussed in Martinelli and Parker (2003) . Fiszbein et al. (2009) include a comprehensive discussion on the economic rationale for CCT. See also Bourguignon et al. (2003) .
3 Examples of empirical papers focusing on the education component of CCT programs include Attanasio et al. (2005) , Baird et al. (2011) , Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011 ), Behrman et al. (2005 , Bursztyn and Co↵man (2012) , Coady and Parker (2004), de Brauw and Hoddinott (2010) , Dubois et al. (2012) , Ferreira et al. (2009) , Maluccio and Flores (2005) , Ponce and Bedi (2010) , Schady and Araujo (2006) , Schultz (2004) , Skoufias and Parker (2001) , Souza and Cardoso (2009), and Todd and Wolpin (2006) .
income (e ciency) and utility (welfare).
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In this paper, we consider a two-period model based on Baland and Robinson (2000) in which parents under-invest in education because they are credit constrained. In addition, we explicitly account for the role of education quality on human capital formation. In our framework, the government provides education free of charge for all households, but this is not su cient to induce the e cient amount of time spent at school. This setting allows us to explore the relative merits of cash transfers (conditional and unconditional) and investments in education quality in terms of e ciency and welfare for credit constrained households.
More specifically, we assume that the government has an exogenously given budget that it can allocate to CCT, UCT, or increasing education quality. Unlike education quality, cash transfers can be targeted to constrained households, albeit imperfectly. We analyze the e↵ect of marginal changes in each of the policy parameters separately when the three policies are in place. Hence, our approach is positive and aims at exploring the relative merits of several commonly used policy instruments.
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In our model there are two inputs, time spent at school and education quality, which can be substitutes or complements in the human capital production function. Parents choose the fraction of time their children spend at school during childhood by considering the impact of that decision on household utility.
6 Since CCT are usually paid on a monthly basis over several years, we model time spent at school as a continuous variable. Each unit of time the child spends at school generates costs in the first period related to foregone child labor earnings and other indirect costs such as clothing, materials, and transportation. In return, it increases household income in the second period. We assume that some households do not have the means to defray the costs in the first period. Since credit market imperfections prevent them from borrowing, their children spend an ine ciently low amount of time at school for any given level of education quality.
Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are a natural instrument to recover e ciency when poverty is the reason why households under-invest in education. By increasing household income in the first period, UCT lead credit constrained households to increase the time their children spend at school. However, it is unclear whether UCT are more or less e↵ective than CCT in enhancing e ciency. Indeed, in the presence of market imperfections, distorting individual behavior by imposing conditions may be more desirable (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956 ). We contribute to this debate by investigating, first, the relative e↵ect in terms of e ciency of UCT and CCT. Second, we explore the conditions under which policies that improve education quality prove more adequate to recover e ciency. Finally, we also evaluate the di↵erent policies from a welfare viewpoint.
We obtain the following results. When constrained households can be perfectly targeted,
CCT are more e ciency enhancing than UCT, as in the previous literature. In contrast, both types of cash transfers are equivalent in terms of welfare. This happens for two reasons.
First, if households were not credit constrained, their choice of time spent at school would be optimal. 7 Thus, they increase the time spent at school when the credit constraint is relaxed, which happens both with an UCT and CCT (of equal amount). Second, CCT change the unit price of education, but allow households to adjust their behavior at the margin.
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These results may change when targeting is imperfect. Given that children in constrained households spend less time at school than those in unconstrained households, constrained households receive less income under CCT than UCT. This undermines the positive e↵ects of CCT on e ciency and makes UCT superior to CCT in terms of welfare for constrained households. We provide an empirical illustration of the comparison of UCT and CCT in terms of e ciency using the Colombian setting. Our results indicate that CCT are superior to UCT in terms of e ciency if no more than 20% of unconstrained, non-targeted, households receive the CCT.
We also show that raising education quality always increases welfare, especially when education quality is low. The e↵ect of raising quality on e ciency is more involved. In particular, not only do households respond to changes in quality by increasing or decreasing the time their children spend at school, depending on the human capital technology, but also changing quality modifies the e cient amount of time spent at school. Surprisingly, our model suggests that, when quality is very low, improving education quality may not be e ciency enhancing. Although we cannot derive general results, we indicate how the model can be empirically tested, so that the e↵ect of improving quality on e ciency can be assessed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the alternative policies, identifies the first best, and the credit constrained solution. Sections 3 and 4 evaluate the e↵ects of revenue neutral changes in the policies in terms of e ciency and welfare. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
A household is composed of one parent and one child and lives for two periods. The parent is endowed with a units of e cient labor (or units of human capital) and the child is endowed with 1 unit of e cient labor. The wage per unit of e cient labor is w, determined exogenously in competitive markets.
In the first period, the parent works, supplying inelastically her e cient labor. She decides on the allocation of her child's time between school, e, and work 1 e, and on the amount of savings s. These are the only economic decisions, they are made by the parent, and determine household consumption of the numeraire good in the first and second periods.
We assume the existence of a public school that transforms q units of the numeraire into one unit of education of quality q (Besley and Coate, 1991). The tuition cost, qe, is covered by the government. For households, the cost of acquiring e units of education is the earnings forgone by children we and other indirect costs of education such as transportation, books or clothing e. Households consume c 1 and save s.
In the second period, the child (now an adult) works supplying h(e, q) e ciency units of labor. The function h is twice continuously di↵erentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in its two arguments. We allow for e and q to be complements, h eq (e, q) > 0, or substitutes, h eq (e, q) < 0. 9 Consumption in the second period, c 2 , is the sum of the parent's savings and the child's labor income, wh(e, q).
Finally, capital markets are imperfect, so that parents can save but cannot borrow, i.e., s > 0. When the parental endowment of e cient labor a is low, households are credit constrained, and their only source of revenue in the second period is the child's labor income.
When a is large, households are unconstrained. We denote a i with i = {c, u} the endowment of a constrained/unconstrained household. There is a mass of households of size 1 and is the proportion of households with endowment a c .
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There are two policies aimed at constrained households: an unconditional cash transfer (UCT), , and a conditional cash transfer (CCT), ✓e. The government cannot perfectly target constrained households, so that only a proportion ↵ of them receives these transfers.
In contrast, a proportion of the 1 unconstrained households also receives these transfers.
The government budget constraint is given by:
where e j i denotes the time spent at school by household ij, where i = {c, u} and j = {b, n} for beneficiary and non-beneficiary of the transfers.
We assume that public policies are financed by an exogenously given budget, e.g., provided
by an international organization, such as The World Bank. This is equivalent to assuming that individuals do not anticipate the e↵ect of those policies on taxes. This is done for simplicity of exposition, since allowing for lump-sum taxes does not change our qualitative results (see Del Rey and Estevan, 2011). We also assume that agents receive zero interest rate for their savings and that they do not discount future utility. We assume that all policies are in place and we evaluate the e↵ect of raising UCT, CCT, and education quality that is provided free of charge to families.
We now turn to the parents' choice of e and s. Household utility is denoted:
In the first period, the household's budget constraint is:
if the household receives the transfer, and
otherwise. Second period consumption is given by:
for all j. Parents maximize (2) with respect to e and s, subject to (3) or (4), and (5), and the constraint that s 0. First order conditions are su cient for maximization since the second order conditions are satisfied. When choosing e, parents equalize the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of spending time at school in terms of household utility. For beneficiary households:
assuming that there is an interior optimal solution for e when ✓ < w + . Thus, we restrict our analysis to the cases where the CCT does not cover all the costs related to education, as supported by empirical evidence (e.g., Schultz, 2004). If they do, the optimal choice of e is 1. Similarly, for non-beneficiaries:
) and e n i > 0.
The optimal choice of s is given by:
When households are unconstrained, they choose the amount of savings that equalizes marginal utility in both periods. When they are credit constrained, savings are zero and the marginal utility of first period consumption is larger: Parents would like to borrow, but are prevented from doing so by credit market imperfections.
Benchmark: Unconstrained Solution without Transfers
In absence of transfers ( = ✓ = 0) and when the savings choice is interior, we combine (7) and (8) to obtain:
Condition (10) characterizes the amount of time spent at school that maximizes households' lifetime income, i.e., the e cient level of e. This is given by the equality between the marginal benefit, wh e (e, q), and the marginal cost of time spent at school accruing to the household, (w + ). Thus, for unconstrained households, the decision concerning education investment maximizes utility and is e cient. 
Constrained Solution without Transfers
When households are too poor and unable to borrow, their children spend an ine ciently low amount of time at school, as in Baland and Robinson (2000) . Indeed, combining (7) and (9):
The ine ciency arises from the fact that the marginal benefit of time spent at school is larger than its marginal cost. Increasing e would require transferring income from the second to the first period to cover education costs, and this cannot be done due to the borrowing constraint.
11 Note that this di↵ers from global e ciency since education is provided free of charge by the government. Fully accounting for all costs and benefits of investing in education would require a more general framework allowing among others for social externalities.
In order to explore the relative merits of alternative policies -UCT, CCT, and improvements in education quality -in enhancing e ciency in the education decision of credit constrained households, we define:
as the ine ciency of the decision concerning time spent at school by constrained households. 
Cash Transfers
An increase in UCT reduces the ine ciency of the decision of constrained households who benefit from the transfers: dI
since, by (6) and the implicit function theorem, when s = 0:
By increasing income in the first period, an increase in UCT reduces the marginal utility of first period consumption and, by (6), the marginal cost of investing in education. As a result, an increase in UCT always increases the amount of time that the child spends at school, reducing the ine ciency of the education decision. This e↵ect is intrinsically related to the relaxation of the credit constraint.
We now show that an increase in CCT also reduces the ine ciency of the constrained 12 Using (7) and (9), we obtain wh e (e c , q) = (w + )
. Although there are in principle two ways of enhancing e ciency, lowering
or wh e (e c , q) (w + ), they are univocally related, and both approaches yield similar qualitative results.
13 Since s = 0, we only need to study the marginal e↵ects on the education decision through (6).
household decisions:
since, proceeding as before:
Similar to the UCT, the increase in CCT reduces the marginal cost in terms of utility of first period consumption, leading to more time spent at school. As before, this e↵ect alleviates the credit constraint. Moreover, the reduction in the marginal cost is now enhanced by the reduction in the price of education due to ✓.
In order to compare the two policies, we now evaluate the e↵ect of raising ✓ while reducing in order to keep the budget balanced. The e↵ect of this change on ine ciency is given by
d and, from (1), it is required that:
for given e 
Plugging (13) and (14) into (16):
The sign of this expression depends on the sign of the numerator, since h ee < 0 and the sign of the denominator is also negative: 
If constrained households can be perfectly targeted, i.e., = 0, CCT are always more e↵ective than UCT in reducing the ine ciency of the decision of constrained households who are beneficiaires, by (17). Indeed, CCT induce a higher increase in time spent at school through the price e↵ect. CCT are clearly more distortive than UCT since they are conditioned on behavior. Still, in the presence of market imperfections, this result shows that it may be desirable to introduce additional distortions, in line with the Theory of the Second Best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956 ).
When unconstrained households cannot be excluded from receiving the transfer, i.e., > 0, it is unclear whether UCT or CCT is the best policy in terms of e ciency. On the one hand, CCT has a larger e↵ect on behavior through the price e↵ect. On the other hand, constrained households receive less with CCT than with UCT, since their children spend less time at school than unconstrained households. Rearranging (17), CCT are more e↵ective than UCT in reducing the ine ciency if:
This condition will be more easily satisfied the better the targeting of constrained households, i.e., the larger ↵ and/or the smaller , the smaller the di↵erence in time spent at school by children in constrained and unconstrained households, and/or the smaller (w+ ✓)
For a logarithmic utility function, this last term reduces to (w +  ✓) /c b 1c , i.e., the net cost of a unit of time spent at school relative to the first period consumption of a constrained household.
A quantitative example comparing CCT and UCT on e ciency grounds
Since all the parameters and variables in (18) are observable, we can perform some backof-the-envelope calculations to obtain an approximate targeting threshold that ensures that CCT are superior to UCT in terms of e ciency. As an illustration, we consider the Colombian 
Education Quality
In this section we disentangle the conditions that make quality improvements reduce the ine ciency of constrained families decisions. In our model, since all children attend the same school system, any policy a↵ecting education quality necessarily a↵ects all households. For credit constrained households, an increase in q has the following e↵ect on the time children 
by (6) Even if time spent at school increases as a result of quality improvements, this does not guarantee that e ciency increases. In contrast to UCT and CCT, an increase in quality alters the e cient level of time spent at school itself. This can be seen by di↵erentiating 
The first term in (20) represents the change in time spent at school following an increase in q. The second term in (20) represents the change in the e cient level of e. More precisely, h eq (e, q) is the direct e↵ect of quality on the marginal productivity of time spent at school.
It is positive (negative) when time spent at school and education quality are complements (substitutes), implying that the e cient level of e increases (decreases) following the increase in q. For a given choice of e, the ine ciency increases (decreases) due to this second term.
Thus, if h eq (e, q) > 0, parents may increase the time their children spend at school, but the e cient level of investment also increases, following an increase in q. In contrast, if h eq (e, q) < 0, parents reduce their children's time at school when quality increases, but the e cient e also goes down.
An estimation strategy to test the model predictions
In order to investigate things further, we put together ( 
where
A threshold of complementarity/substitutability of e and q is implicitly defined by this expression. Since h eq a↵ects the decision variable, we cannot isolate this threshold. Still, we can test condition (21) if we assume specific functional forms for the utility and production function.
This would require the estimation of the education production function h(e, q). The dependent variable should be a measure of achievement, such as test scores or adult pro-ductivity, and the explanatory variables should include school quality measures (possibly aggregated in an index) and school attendance. In order to allow for a flexible production function, one should allow for non-linearities and interaction e↵ects between e and q. An example of a regression function would be:
h(e, q) = 0 + 1 e + 2 q + 3 e 2 + 4 q 2 + 5 eq + 6 e 2 q 2 + ".
In this case, h e = 1 + 2 3 e + 5 q + 2 6 eq 2 , h q = 2 + 2 4 q + 5 e + 2 6 e 2 q, h ee = 2 3 + 2 6 q 2 and h eq = 5 + 4 6 eq. Then, by assuming an explicit functional form for the utility function, our model can be used to predict the e↵ect of raising quality on e ciency.
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For example, if h ee e b c , q is 0 (i.e., 3 and 6 are not significant), we see that h eq e b c , q < 0 becomes a necessary and su cient condition for an increase in quality to lead to an increase in e ciency, from (21). Yet, there is little evidence for substitutability in developing countries, as discussed above. In the case of complements, an increase in q may lead to a reduction in ine ciency when the second term in the right-hand side of (21) is smaller in absolute value than the first term. Interestingly, the lower is quality and/or children's time spent at school, the larger is the second term in the right-hand side of (21) by the concavity of h, making it less likely that increases in quality lead to a reduction in ine ciency.
It can be argued that, even if raising quality moves the ideal level of time spent at school further up, we should value the fact that children spend more time at higher quality schools when e and q are su ciently strong complements. This would be particularly so in presence of a social externality that increases with school quality. Still, our model suggests that it is better to first eliminate the ine ciency, i.e., the credit constraint, and then raise quality.
It can be shown that once households are unconstrained, raising quality does not a↵ect the e ciency, unlike CCT, and it raises output.
Welfare
In this section, we focus on the e↵ect of cash transfers and education quality on constrained household utility. We start with cash transfers. Using (1)- (5) with and s = 0 and applying the envelope theorem, we obtain that an increase in UCT raises the welfare of constrained households:
An increase in CCT also raises welfare of credit constrained households, but this e↵ect is proportional to the amount of time their children spend at school:
We consider as before the e↵ect of raising ✓ while reducing in order to keep the budget balanced and, using (15), we find the following e↵ect on the welfare of constrained household:
When unconstrained households do not benefit from the transfers, i.e., = 0 , UCT and CCT involving the same budget have the same e↵ect in terms of income. Thus, the credit constraint is relaxed to the same extent in both cases and the e↵ect on welfare is equivalent.
We have seen in Section 3 that UCT and CCT have di↵erent impacts on the choice of time spent at school. However, because households equalize marginal costs and benefits when choosing e, the final e↵ect of the change from UCT to CCT on welfare is nil.
In contrast, when > 0, the welfare e↵ect of UCT is larger than the e↵ect of CCT for constrained households. While UCT is equally shared among all beneficiaries, CCT is based on time spent at school, which is smaller for constrained households than for unconstrained households. As a result, constrained households receive a lower transfer under CCT than under UCT for a given global budget.
The e↵ect of raising quality on the welfare of constrained households is positive.Using
(1)- (5) with s = 0 and applying the envelope theorem, we obtain:
We now compare the welfare e↵ects of transfers and education quality. Using (1), (22), and (24), the welfare e↵ect of increasing education quality and simultaneously reducing UCT for a given budget is given by:
We know that, for constrained households,
. Thus, the second term in (25) is larger (in absolute value) relative to the first the more severe the household credit constraint is. In contrast, low quality contributes to a higher welfare e↵ect of quality improvements due to the concavity of h.
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Summing up, CCT and UCT are equivalent in terms of welfare if constrained households can be perfectly targeted. Otherwise, UCT are preferred to CCT by constrained households.
The e↵ect of quality on welfare is positive. The comparison of the welfare e↵ects of transfers and quality are not clear-cut and need to be carefully examined in each particular case.
The severity of the credit constraint and the fact that cash transfers can be targeted, albeit 16 If increases in education quality could be targeted to constrained households, the second term in the right-hand side of (25) would be smaller, and the benefits of increasing q would be larger. All the other qualitative results would remain the same.
imperfectly, support cash transfers over raising quality. Finally, the lower the initial level of education quality, the higher its marginal productivity and positive welfare e↵ects.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the impact on e ciency and welfare of three alternative policies -UCT, CCT and improvements in education quality -aimed at households that spend an ine ciently low amount of time at school due to credit constraints.
When constrained households can be perfectly targeted, we show that CCT are more e ciency enhancing than UCT because they not only relax the credit constraint, but they also change the unit price of education. In contrast, for a given budget, both cash transfers are equivalent in terms of welfare. We also show that these results depend on the precision of the targeting mechanism. Under su ciently precise targeting, CCT are more e↵ective than UCT in enhancing e ciency, but they are only equivalent in terms of welfare if targeting is perfect.
Improving education quality, by investing in schools, teachers, or any education input other than time spent at school, also increases welfare, especially when education quality is low as in developing countries. However, the e↵ects of improving education quality in terms of e ciency are less clear cut. We provide a testable condition that allows us to predict the impact of increasing quality on the e ciency of the constrained household decisions. Our analysis suggests that when quality is low, cash transfers can be best in terms of e ciency, but not in terms of welfare.
In our model, time spent at school is a continuous variable and CCT, paid by unit of time, change the price of education. This is the most appropriate approach when considering decisions over the lifetime, as we do in this paper. Alternatively, CCT could be conditioned on achieving a pre-determined threshold of school participation. In this case, households decisions could be distorted at the margin and the equivalence of CCT and UCT in terms of welfare, when constrained households can be targeted, would no longer hold.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the literature has focused on arguments other than credit constraints to justify the implementation of CCT programs. Accounting for positive externalities of education would certainly increase the positive e↵ects of time spent at school, but our qualitative results would remain unchanged. In contrast, accounting for arguments such as irrationality and self-control problems would increase the attractiveness of CCT relative to the other policies. Our approach allows to identify conditions under which CCT are best even when these arguments are neglected.
We have also neglected the e↵ect of the di↵erent policies on taxes paid by the households.
This has the advantage of isolating the impact of expenditures from any distortive e↵ect of taxation. A previous version of this work considered a very simple structure of taxation with uniform lump-sum taxes paid on the second period and obtained similar qualitative results.
It would be interesting to consider alternative sources of revenue more specific to developing countries. We leave these issues for future research.
